Pakistan’s Last Gambit? continues .....

The army deployed more than 75,000 to 80,000 troops, in addition to scores of tribal lashkars (militia groups) and paramilitary forces along the 2,400-kilometre long border. The overall command of the operation was the responsibility of XI Corps headquartered in Peshawar (NWFP), which had been, not long ago, the primary support and logistics base for the Taliban. Raised in 1975, the Corps, comprising two divisions and an independent Armoured Brigade, had acted as a reserve for the two Corps, X and Formation Command Northern Areas (FCNA), deployed on the eastern border with India.

One of the major operational handicaps for the military was its inexperience in executing military and counter-insurgency operations, particularly in areas populated by Pashtuns.

Besides, the leading unit of the forces, Frontier Corps, was both inept and corrupt, and under the influence of Saudi-funded madrasas and tribal politics. As a series of spectacular failures in the battlefront showed up, it began to dawn on the military leadership that they had another, far more serious, problem at hand. An internal Pakistan Army document underscored the problem more clearly:

“It was the first time in the history of the Pakistan Army when officers and soldiers refused to fire bullets on their fellow nationals.

During the operations, the US soldiers in Afghanistan too had observed Pakistani troops allowing Taliban and al Qaeda elements to cross the border at will and even welcoming them at checkpoints and guardrooms. There is a reported instance of Corps unit members firing at the US-assisted Afghan Army units. At another time, anonymous attackers fired at a meeting of American, Pakistani, and Afghan army officers on the Afghan-Pakistan border. It was believed that the assailants were angry FC soldiers.

To be continued....