Chapter 1 Continues…

The situation has been made worse by the continued absence of the Supreme Leader Mullah Omar and, in particular, the arrest of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in 2010, which gave space to these subordinate leaders to jockey for power.6 A number of other commanders have also broken away to form their own group. The most recent high profile desertion has been that of Mullah Najibullah, who openly criticises the Taliban leadership for being ‘traitors’ for pursuing peace talks with the Afghan government and the international community. Commanding about 8000 troops he could not only pose a serious threat to the Taliban leadership, but could also create problems for reaching an agreement with the insurgents.7
ANSF
Another challenge to the Taliban is likely to come from the ANSF, which is in a much better state to fend off the insurgents as compared to the Afghan Army at the time of President Najibullah in the early 1990s. Significant improvements have been made in the last five years as far as increasing the number and training of personnel is concerned. As of October 2013, the total strength of the ANSF stood at approximately 344, 500 of which the Afghan National Army (ANA) is 185,300 personnel, the Afghan National Police (ANP) is 152,600 personnel and the Air Force 6,600 personnel.8 This is more or less in line with the original envisioned end strength of the ANSF of 352,000 personnel by December 2014 of which the ANA was to be 187,000, the ANP was to be 157,000 and the Air Force was to be 8,000. There has also been a significant increase in the number of Afghan trainers and newer institutions for the training of both senior officers and men are functional.

the training of both senior officers and men are functional.
The ANSF has also been hailed for its successful military operations against the insurgents in recent years. For instance, its role in repelling the insurgents during the ‘Kabul Siege’ of April 2012 was lauded.

To be continued…