Impact on India continues...

Besides the traditional set of explanations of creating a ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan and inflicting a ‘thousand cuts’ on India, there are two other compelling reasons which merit attention.

These are—the alarming spread and influence of extremist groups within Pakistan, many of them autonomous and virulently against the Pakistan Army. Second is the gnawing fear that many of the proxy groups, like LeT, considered to be loyal, might also begin to assert themselves more aggressively, forced in large measure by the second and third generation cadre and leadership of these groups.

The possibility of these ‘loyalist’ groups aligning with al Qaeda cannot be discounted either. HuA, for instance, a close proxy of Rawalpindi, had turned to al Qaeda and the Taliban for support and sustenance once the official patronage began to decline. The possible re-emergence of al Qaeda in the region, following the US drawdown, makes such a possibility even more real.

CHANGE IN TACTICS AND CAPABILITY

The period 2006-2008 saw a marked consolidation of a new set of jihadis, influenced and trained by al Qaeda trainers and ideologues, in Pakistan. These men, both recruits and trainers, are quite different from the so-called mujahideens of yesteryears. These are better trained men with superior arms, greater funds and are more ideologically driven than the jihadis in Afghanistan. The present day terrorists being spawned in the tribal areas, fighting the most powerful armies in the world and not losing, are trained and indoctrinated to be more ruthless, equally willing to take or give life—the ultimate weapon for suicide attacks. Although suicide bombers are not new to Kashmir, there is only one reported incident of such an attack in any other part of India. On October 12, 2005, a terrorist who entered India via Bangladesh blew himself up outside the headquarters of the Special Task Force in

Hyderabad.

To be continued...