Chapter 2 continues…

From Pakistan’s perspective, it was critical that radical Islamic Pashtun groups were favoured within Afghanistan. Islamists provided an opportunity to undermine secular Afghan or Pashtun nationalism, as it was felt that any hint of sympathy with the Pashtun nationalist cause would be superseded by religious solidarity with Pakistan.

It was hoped that this would keep the Pandora’s Box of Pashtun nationalism firmly closed. It is for this reason that the Afghan mujahideen, who were trained, funded and supported by the ISI during the Soviet invasion, excluded the secular and leftist Pashtun groups, such as the Afghan Millat or members of the Afghan royal family, and even the support for non- Pashtun Islamists like Ahmad Shah Massoud was limited.

AFGHAN JIHAD
It was the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979 which proved to be a major turning point in the nascent aggressive pro-active policy of Pakistan vis-à-vis Afghanistan. It completed the transition of Pakistan from a state that was a victim of Afghan transgressions into a frontier state that would constantly seek to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan to safeguard and promote its own interests.

The Soviet invasion had rattled the Pakistan government. There was a fear in Pakistan, and in the US, that the Soviet imperialist outreach would not be limited to Afghanistan, but would eventually extend into Pakistan as well. Abdul Sattar, a former Pakistani diplomat said, “The Soviet military intervention provoked a deep sense of alarm in Pakistan. Suddenly the buffer disappeared and if the Soviet rulers consolidated their control in Afghanistan they could use it as a springboard to reach the warm waters of the Arabian Sea.”

The fear of an emerging ‘Kabul-Moscow-Delhi’ axis had necessitated the adoption of a policy to undermine the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

To be continued…