Chapter 2 continues…

Junejo, on the other hand, was prepared to accept an agreement which left Najibullah’s government in power in order to facilitate a rapid Soviet pull-out. Junejo was able to muster the requisite domestic political consensus on Afghanistan by convening an unprecedented all-party conference, which along with the pressure exerted by the US and the Soviet Union ultimately led Pakistan to sign the Geneva Accords in April 1988. The different perceptions of the civilian and military leaders within Pakistan regarding Najibullah were evident during the first tenure of Benazir Bhutto as well. Bhutto had favoured a proposal brought forth by the Soviet Foreign Minister, which would have allowed Najibullah to stay on in power for a transitional period of six months. However, the plan was vetoed by Hamid Gul, the DG of ISI and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who too was a fervent proponent of the Afghan Jihad.

The Accords, signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan, bound both countries to specific terms, prohibiting them from interfering in the internal affairs of the other country. In particular, they committed the two countries to ensuring that their territory was not used to promote any secessionist or terrorist activities against the other and to not directly interfering in the internal affairs of the other through an armed intervention or military occupation.

Although the US and the Soviet Union were meant to act as guarantors for these Accords, neither of them refused to withdraw military assistance for their respective allies in Afghanistan. The US also stated that by acting as a guarantor of the settlement it did not intend to imply in any respect recognition of the present regime as the lawful government of Afghanistan. Pakistan, thus, was to see the Geneva Accords as an inconvenient episode which interrupted play.

Pakistan was sure that the Najibullah government would not be able to survive for long following the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

To be continued…