Editor’s note continues…

Chapter 1: ‘Afghanistan in 2015’ provides the context for this volume. By examining the present situation in the security, political and economic sectors of Afghanistan, it argues that in the near future Afghanistan is likely to remain violent, weak and unstable but unlikely to lose control to the insurgents. However, for Hamid Karzai’s successor and the Afghan National Security Forces to maintain status quo, prolonged international aid is absolutely necessary.
Chapter 2: ‘Pakistan’s Afghan Predicament’, examines the driving factors for Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Compelled by Afghanistan’s support for the Pashtunistan issue and fear of encirclement by India, Pakistan sought to achieve a friendly regime in Kabul. This chapter describes the policy followed by Pakistan towards Afghanistan since 1947 till 2001 and argues that Pakistan’s strategic objectives vis-a-vis Afghanistan have been the same over the years, only the means to achieve them have changed.
Chapter 3: ‘Strategic Playbook’ looks at the strategic enclave within Pakistan and its role in defining Pakistan’s foreign policy. This chapter examines the beliefs and compulsions of interest groups within the Military Establishment, which in turn determines Pakistan’s approach to both India and Afghanistan. In particular, this chapter examines the role of the ISI in defining and executing Pakistan’s Afghan policy.

Chapter 4: ‘Critical Triangle: US-Pakistan-Afghanistan’, delves into the history of US-Pakistan ties and their impact on Afghanistan. It will show that Pakistan’s focus on India was the main driver of its overwhelmingly defence and state-state ties with the US. While these ties did not succeed in improving Pakistan’s position vis-a-vis India, they had catastrophic consequences for Afghanistan-pushing it out of the US orbit, then into the arms of the Soviets and finally to be subsumed into Pakistan’s quest for strategic depth.
Chapter 5: ‘Pakistan’s Last Gambit?’examines the rising militancy and internal security threat for Pakistan. It explores Pakistan’s duplicity in the Global War on Terror and how its actions against home-grown militants have led these militants to take actions against the Pakistani state. The chapter argues that despite these internal challenges it is highly unlikely that there will be a ‘strategic shift’ in Pakistan’s Afghan policy post-2014.

To be continued…