Pakistan’s Last Gambit? continues....

Since the overall emphasis of the volume is on examining Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and its possible consequences, it would suffice to scrutinise the last two factors which, for reasons of brevity, could be summed up as the question of ‘will’ and ‘skill’ on the part of Pakistan.

This will help in gauging changes, if any, in Pakistan’s traditional policy of supporting terrorist groups, and in getting a measure of the overall capability of the Pakistan Army to deal with the challenge of violence staking the country which many believe to be an ‘existential threat.’ Both these factors will have a bearing on what Pakistan does in Afghanistan in the near future, and whether it is capable of riding the storm which the 2014 drawdown is sure to trigger.

The problem of intent is relatively easy to comprehend. Pakistan Army, the lead decision maker, is simply not interested in giving up its traditional policy of using terrorist proxies as instruments of the state. It used to believe, rather firmly, that the policy gave good dividends back in 1996 when the Taliban took charge of Afghanistan, and India had to forcibly leave the country.

This belief was rudely shaken up by the events post-2001 when violence came home to roost. Though there is now a growing sense of unease among the top military leadership about the terrorist violence within the country, there is no consensus among them on how to deal with it.

The overall feeling is that the terrorist proxies can be managed and that there is no great urgency to neutralise them. David Kilcullen elaborated this conundrum with typical military bluntness—“substantial parts of the Pakistani security establishment are complicit with the enemy, whether through incompetence, intimidation or ill intent.

To be continued....