Critical Triangle continues....

One fact that shines through is that the US policy of equidistance remained firm, even though it faced considerable contradictions. On the one hand, McGhee expected that Afghan Pakistan talks would be substantive where the Afghans could raise the issue of Pasthunistan, but the Pakistanis rejected this outright claiming that this was a purely domestic issue and none of Kabul’s business. On the other hand, India took much the same stance on Kashmir as Pakistan had on Pashtunistan.

Prime Minister Nazimuddin offered “major concessions” on, the question of troop withdrawal ratios. When Chester Bowles the new Ambassador to India, heard these, he optimistically cabled Washington claiming “it is difficult to see how Nehru can turn down these proposals.” Yet why exactly Bowles was so delighted remains unclear, since he knew India’s position very clearly and that was similar to Pakistan’s position vis-à-vis the Durand line in 1951 and since.

That position was that India would not budge on the issue and that “ratios were not the way to approach the problem since it implied the Pakistanis had definite rights in Kashmir.” However, in spite of these contradictions—and while no conversation exists on this point they would have been obvious, the US determinedly maintained equidistance and did not push or force anyone against a wall.

The US strategy was summed up by McGhee as “our basic policy of attempting to help both parties without siding with the other.” Similarly, Hickerson and Byroade’s cables indicate frustration with Nehru and yet they were unwilling to push any settlement on anyone, be it Pashtunistan or Kashmir. One of the cables state, “The Department of State considers Nehru the key figure in the settlement of the Kashmir issue. Until he is willing to make some agreement, there of course would be none. When he indicates a sincere desire to make a settlement, it probably will follow.”

To be continued......