Critical Triangle Continues....

It is in this background that US actions in the subcontinent must be weighed. On the one hand Iran shared a border with the USSR, had been a victim of Soviet aggression, and on the other was Pakistan that shared no border with and had been ignored almost completely by the USSR. It was no wonder then that Pakistan’s claims of being a frontline state did not elicit much support till 1948 when socialist forces started making their presence felt in Iran. In that context, the US wanted to prevent a larger escalation of Soviet meddling into Afghanistan and the subcontinent, and alienating any one party here would have the immediate effect of drawing the Soviets in. It was this real politik calculus that decided the US policy of equidistance from India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, it was the Eisenhower administration’s uncompromising stand against communism that paved the way for Pakistan’s entry into SEATO and CENTO.

ANTI-COMMUNIST ALLIANCE

The fulcrum of British defence plans for the Middle East was Egypt with the notion that the region would be defended from the Suez Canal. This had fitted in nicely with Jinnah’s theory of reorienting towards the Middle East. So when the British proposed the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) in 1950, they were met by an instant refusal by Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951. This had to do with the fact that Pakistan could not possibly spare troops for a western defence while its main adversary was on the east. Liaquat had specifically said that this reorientation would depend on a resolution of the Kashmir dispute and consequently for those prioritising the Soviet threat, Kashmir became the main barrier to bringing Pakistan into the western alliance network. As McGhee summed it up the challenge was how to guarantee Pakistan “insurance against attack from India” without alienating India.

To be continued.....